University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1946

Trust Investments: Earmarking or Nominees?
George Gleason Bogert

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George Gleason Bogert, "Trust Investments: Earmarking or Nominees?," 24 Texas Law Review 417 (1946).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

TEXASLAW REVIEW
VOL. XXIV

No. 4

JUNE, 1946

TRUST INVESTMENTS: EARMARKING OR NOMINEES?

By GEORGE G. BOGERT*
AMERICAN LAW AS TO EARMAR.ING PRIOR TO MAY,

1935

Until the early 1930's the American courts of equity were nearly
unanimous in holding that trustees were under a duty to earmark
trust property, that is, that mortgages, deeds, stock certificates,
registered bonds, and bank accounts should show on their faces that
they were held by the trustee for a particular trust., The one
exception was in the case of bearer bonds which were held lawful
2
because of their great convenience and a widely adopted practice.

This duty to earmark was absolute. It was not an obligation to
earmark as far as reasonable or as far as the trustee thought best.
It was a duty to label the trust assets as clearly as the nature of the
documents would permit. Furthermore the trustee was required to
tag the trust property in such a way as to give the public the maximum
notice and not merely to keep records in his own office which would
*James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'Mitchell v. Moore, 95 U.S. 587 (1877); De Jarnette v. De Jarnette, 41 Ala. 708
(1868) (note and mortgage); Chancellor v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, 58 So. 423
(1912) (bank account); In re Arguello, 97 Cal. 196, 31 Pac. 937 (1893) (bank
account); White v. Sherman, 168 II. 589, 48 N.E. 128 (1897) (railroad stocks);
Gilbert v. Welch, 75 Ind. 557 (1881) (bank stock); In re Riordan, 216 Iowa 1138,
248 N.W. 21 (1933) (bank account); Pedigo v. Pedigo's Committee, 247 Ky. 403,
57 S.W. (2d) 54 (1932) (title to realty); Carey v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
168 Md. 501, 178 Atl. 242 (1935) (bank account); McAllister v. Commonwealth,
30 Pa. 536 (1858) (bank account); Freas's Estate, 231 Pa. 256, 79 At. 513 (1911)
(title to realty in name of nominee of corporate trustee); Re Hodges' Estate,
66 Vt. 70, 28 Atl. 663 (1893) (note and mortgage).
2Matter of Halstead, 44 N.Y.Misc. 176, 89 N.Y.Supp. 806 (1904), aff'd, 110
App.Div. 909, 95 N.Y.Supp. 1131 (1905) al'd, 184 N.Y. 563 (1906); dictum in
Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N.Y. 514, 114 N.E. 1057 (1916); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 12 R.I. 544 (1880). Contra: In re Buckelew, 128 N.J.Eq. 81, 13 A.(2d)
855 (1940) (failure to register a bond treated as a breach of trust rendering the
trustee liable for its depreciation).
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distinguish the trust property from his own property.' What might
be called "external" earmarking was demanded, and not merely
"internal" bookkeeping. The rule was applied to individual and
corporate trustees alike.
The case law was equally clear as to the effect of a breach of this
duty, namely, that the beneficiary could avoid the investment which
was not earmarked, could treat it as being held by the trustee for
his own account, and could hold the trustee personally liable for the
amount of the trust funds invested in the unlabelled asset. This
option was given the cestui in all cases, and not merely in those
instances where the trustee acted in bad faith4 or no benefit resulted
to the trust from lack of earmarking. This sanction for breach of
duty was clearly stated to be in the nature of a penalty, the object
of which was to deter trustees in general from engaging in a practice
which was regarded as highly dangerous to the beneficiaries. The
courts did not require proof of damage arising from failure to earmark. In imposing this penalty the courts adopted the same attitude
as in the cases of disloyalty by a trustee, where they had held in
scores of cases that if the trustee placed himself in a position of confficting interest while acting for the trust, the transaction was absolutely voidable by the beneficiary, without proof of actual bad
faith or damage. Indeed the earmarking rule might well have been
regarded as merely one phase of the loyalty doctrine, although there
does not appear to have been any express statement to that effect.5
In a few states the rule was codified. Thus, in the Field Code in
California we find the declaration that "A trustee who wilfully and
unnecessarily mingles the trust property with his own, so as to
constitute himself in appearance its absolute owner, is liable for its
safety in all events, and for the value of its use."' ' And this section
was copied in Montana, 7 North Dakota s and South Dakota,9 except
$White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589, 48 N.E. 128 (1897); Freas's Estate, 231 Pa. 256,
79 AtI. 513 (1911).
4
1n re _Arguello, 97 Cal. 196, 31 Pac. 937 (1893); Gilbert v. Welch, 75 Ind.
557, 561 (1881) (the court said: "there should be no inquiry permitted into the
good faith of such transactions, the secret springs of which, in most cases, it would
probably be impossible to discover").
5
"The rule is designed to protect the trustee from temptation, from the hazard
of loss, and -of being a possible defaulter, as well as to protect the trust fund."
Re Hodges' Estate, 66 Vt. 70, 73, 28 Atl. 663, 664 (1893).
6CA. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1941) §2236. But see Laws of 1943, c. 811, as to

use of nominees.

RBv. CODES (1935) §7896.
8N. D. R.C. 1943, §59-0117.
7MONT.

9S. D. CoDE (1939) §59-0114.
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for the last clause. Until recently the New York Surrogate's Court
Act 0 made the holding of fiduciary assets without earmarking a
misdemeanor. Some of the older banking codes also seem to have
restated this duty,"' but the acts relating to banks and trust companies
which have been adopted since 1900 seem to require merely a
physical segregation of the securities of each account and do not
mention any duty to earmark.12

In establishing this stringent common law rule the courts were
concerned with two objectives, namely, (1) securing to the beneficiary
his remedy of tracing, and (2) giving to the beneficiary the protection arising from notice to the public of the trust and its terms.
Illustrations of instances in which these two purposes are forwarded
by the application of the earmarking rule are numerous, but the
following are among the more important:
10§231 (applying to executors, administrators, guardians, and testamentary
trustees only), added by L. 1916, c. 588, which became a law May 18, 1916, and
became effective Sept. 1, 1916. It was held in In re Harris' Estate, 169 N.Y.Misc.
943, 9 N.Y.Supp.(2d) 508 (1939), that a settlor could not relieve his trustee of the
duty to earmark recognized by this section. For recent changes see note 39, post.
In Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N.Y. 514, 114 N.E. 1057 (1916), a corporate
trustee had prior to 1916 held mortgages in its name, without trust label, and
allotted shares in them to trusts held by it. Life beneficiaries were notified of
the investments and form of holding. There were objections to investment in
participations in the mortgages and also to the way in which the mortgages were
held. The court held the participations were legal trust investments and that the
notices to the life cestuis prevented any objection to the form of holding. The court
stated the common law earmarking rule and apparently reaffirmed it, but apparently
held that the beneficiaries had waived their rights to object by failure to complain
after receiving notices. Willard Bartlett, C. J., concurred in a short opinion in
which he approved the statements about earmarking but said "the parties objecting
to the account are entitled to have those views carried into effect," and he voted
to modify the order "so as to require the respondent to alter the form of the
investments so as to conform to the -practice approved in the opinion of Chase, J."
This decision seems to be a recognition of the existence in New York of the
common law earmarking rule prior to 1916. Section 231 of the SuRRoGATE'S
CouRT AcT merely restated the rule as to fiduciaries accounting in that court and
added the criminal penalty.
11In Yost's Estate, 316 Pa. 463, 466, 175 Atl. 383, 384 (1934), the Pennsylvania
Banking Act, as amended to 1925, is quoted as requiring that trust companies "shall
keep all trust funds and investments separate and apart from the assets of the
companies, and all investments made by the said companies as fiduciaries shall
be so designated as that the trust to which such investment shall belong shall be
clearly known."
12 See, for example, Mich. Pub. Acts Extra Session 1933, No. 3, amending §11901
of the statutes; Wis. STAT. (1943) §221.04, as amended by L. 1943, c. 359; §11(k)
FED. RBs. AcT, 12 U.S.C.A., 38 STAT. 251 (1913) and §12 of Reg. F; Principles of
Trust Institutions, 1933, Art. IV, S1.
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A. Dishonest trustee attempts to dump poor investments when he
accounts. It is obvious that if a trustee is permitted to keep his personal assets and trust investments in a pool, with no earmarks on
any of them, he will be tempted, when called to account for his
trust, to allocate to the trust the securities which have turned out
to be least satisfactory.
B. Trustee dies or absconds. In these cases when the beneficiary
or a successor trustee seeks to save something from the wreck of an
insolvent trustee's estate he will be greatly aided by labels on assets
which were bought with trust funds.
C. Notice to creditors. If trust investments are not labelled as
such, and are held indiscriminately with the property of the trustee,
the personal creditors of the trustee may seize the trust property
under execution, attachment, in bankruptcy, or otherwise, and a
heavy burden will be placed on the beneficiaries of the trust to prove
that the investments taken were bought with trust funds. Even if
the cestuis are successful in their efforts, they will be put to expense;
and if they fail, what is in fact trust property will be applied to the
payment of the personal obligations of the trustee.'$
D. Notice to purchasers. It is well established that one dealing
with a known trustee is charged 'with knowledge of the trustee's
powers. If trust property is clearly marked as owned by a specific
trust, a third person to whom the trustee seeks to mortgage, pledge
or sell the asset, will be aparticipant in the breach of trust, and will
not be a bona fide purchaser, if in fact the trustee had no power
to make the transfer, or, although he had such power, if he was
transferring for an improper purpose and the third person actually
knew of the improper purpose or had knowledge of facts which
made his participation in the transaction "an act of bad faith."
It is sometimes argued that the rule is of little value because a
dishonest trustee can always convert the trust investments into cash
or bearer bonds and thus easily embezzle the trust assets; that holding
cash or bearer bonds is legal and will excite no suspicion and put
no one on notice of an intended breach; and hence that a trustee
who decides to loot the estate will not hold stocks and mortgages,
if earmarking is required as to them and if failure to mark them
may to some extent handicap him.
3
1In School District of Greenfield v. First National Bank in Greenfield, 102 Mass.
174 (1869), a bank was successful in claiming under its lien for a debt owed it
by the trustee individually trust funds which had been deposited in the bank
without trust label.
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It is not believed that this is a sound argument. The rule
admittedly does not constitute an insurance policy against dishonesty,
carelessness, or loss to the trust. No rule of trust administration
does have that effect. It merely has some tendency to force a trustee
into practices which are safest for the beneficiary. Many dishonest
trustees are not systematic and skillful in embezzling and are caught
before they have completed the job. Others are honest but unbusinesslike or ignorant and attempt to make transfers which are in
fact in breach of trust and they may be deterred by the proposed
transferees, if the property is earmarked. The fear of penalty liability
will have some deterrent effect on both dishonest fiduciaries and
honest, ignorant or unbusinesslike trustees.
Notwithstanding the clearly established rule described above, many
trust institutions held mortgages, stocks, and other investments either
in their own names, or in the name of a nominee of the trust institution, without reference to any trust, during the generation immediately preceding the depression of 1929.14 They kept complete
records within their trust departments as to actual ownership, segregated the documents and securities of each trust in a separate portfolio in their vaults, and regarded these practices either as compliance
with the earmarking rule, or as a satisfactory substitute therefor.
The various books kept by corporate trustees, and by many skilled
individual trustees, undoubtedly show clearly from day to day what
are the investments of each trust; and if the stock certificates, mortgages or other instruments representing these trust investments are
not earmarked on their faces, it is customary to execute declarations
of trust regarding those instruments and place them in the portfolio of the appropriate trust in the vaults. Bank examiners make a
complete check to see that the assets of each trust, according to the
14"The practice followed by the company in thus carrying these mortgages has
been followed for over 40 years by trust companies generally in Allegheny County
and elsewhere throughout the state, with the exception of Philadelphia County.
It has been approved by the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County and by the
Department of Banking of the Commonwealth. Inquiries by that department
through the state have ascertained that trust mortgages aggregating $138,000,000,
at least, are carried without disclosure of the trusteeship on the public record,
while other mortgages amounting to over $78,000,000 are designated upon the
public record as trust mortgages." Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 533, 182 Atl.
248, 250 (1936).
In Chapter House Circle v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558,
564, 186 AtI. 543 (1936), it was stated that the trial court had found that trust
companies of the highest standing in that state had been holding mortgages without trust label for at least thirty-five years prior to that litigation.
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books, are in fact to be found in the envelope or box assigned to that
trust in the vault. There is thus a strong argument that these
records constitute for the beneficiary all the earmarking he needs to
enable him to trace the investments of his trust into the hands of
the trustee. Such records are, however, more subject to manipulation
than earmarks placed on the investment documents at the time of
the purchase of the investments and also on stock books or public
records. And, furthermore, these internal records in the offices of
the trustee have no effect in giving notice to third persons who may
deal with the trust investments, as in the case of buyers, mortgagees,
and pledgees.
As trustees' accounts were presented in the early 1930's, and shrinkage and failure of numerous trust investments were brought sharply
to the attention of beneficiaries and their lawyers, in many cases
the earmarking rule was seized upon as a basis for attempting to
avoid the unfortunate investments. A few of these cases reached
the Supreme Courts prior to the completion of the Restatement of
Trusts in May, 1935.
5
In Keen's Estate,"
decided in 1932, an individual trustee held a
mortgage in his name as trustee for a named trust. The mortgage
was in default. "To obviate the expense of foreclosure proceedings,
the trustee agreed to take title to the property, and, in order to avoid
a merger, took it in his own name." After holding the property
for a time, and crediting the trust with its income, he sold it and
credited the estate with the sale price. As one of many objections
to the trustee's account the beneficiaries contended that, because the
fee was held for a time in the name of the trustee without earmarking,
they could claim from the trustee the amount of the mortgage with
interest. The court's entire discussion of this contention was as

follows:
"This is too broad a statement.

We adhere closely to the rule that

where a trustee takes title for his personal benefit, whether in his
-own name or in that of some other person, the beneficiaries may
elect as appellants now contend; but this rule has no applicability
where, as here, title was taken for the benefit of the estate, which
as would have been the case
received all the money realized exactly
15
had the title been taken in its name.1 a
Thus, Keen's Estate seems to make an exception to the ordinary
rule based on two factors, namely, (1) that a purpose beneficial to
15306 Pa. 363, 159 Adt. 713 (1932).
15&306 Pa. 363 at 371, 159 At. 713

-at 715.
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the estate was achieved by taking the title without trust label,
i.e., the prevention of merger; and (2) that at the time of the accounting in question no property was held without earmarking, since the
realty had been sold and its proceeds applied for trust purposes, and
thus the violation of duty had been cured by later transactions.
No stress was laid on good faith, although it obviously existed.
Merger could have been prevented by an expression of intent in the
caeed as well as by the method adopted.18
Yost's Estate,17 was decided by an opinion handed down Nov. 26,
1934. In it a corporate trustee which held a mortgage in its own
name, and had placed it in a mortgage pool, withdrew the mortgage
and made entries on its own books to the effect that the mortgage
was henceforth held for the Yost trust, but did not assign the mortgage
to itself as trustee or change the county records to that effect. Later
the mortgage was foreclosed and the realty purchased by the trustee
on behalf of the trust for costs and taxes. The court states: "At the
sheriff's sale the property was bought in by the company for costs
and taxes."1It seems probable that the deed ran to the trust
company with trust label, but this does not clearly appear. At any
rate at the time the objection was made the mortgage had been foreclosed, so that in this respect there was great similarity to Keen's
Estate. The beneficiaries were allowed to avoid the investment and
compel the trustee to restore to the trust the amount invested in the
mortgage. The court cited the older authorities which applied the
penalty rule, but made no reference to Keen's Estate. It said:
"Only by giving the beneficiary a right to make the trustee account
for funds thus invested can a practice so fraught with danger be
effectually prevented. Nor is the danger less where the
trustee is
17b
a corporation than where the trustee is an individual."
In the Yost case there were apparently (1) good faith; (2) a benefit
to the trust through increased facility in management of the mortgage,
although this is not stressed by the court; (3) no damage caused by
breach of the earmarking rule; and (4) the breach was as to a
holding which had ceased before the accounting. The facts were
thus very similar to Keen's Estate, but the decision was exactly the
leWoodside v. Lippold, 113 Ga. 877, 39 S.E. 400 (1901); Thauer v. Sniith, 213
Wis. 91, 250 N.W. 842 (1933).
17316 Pa. 463, 175 Atl. 383 (1934).
17a316 Pa. 463 at 466, 175 AtI. 383 at 384.

17316 Pa. 463 at 468, 175 At. 383 at 385.
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opposite. Although Keen's Estate was not cited by the court in
Yost's Estate, it would seem that the result of the court's decree in
the latter case was either in substance an implied overruling of the
former case or a "confinement of it to its facts." The earmarking
question was given brief and cursory treatment in Keen's Estate,
but was discussed at length in Yost's Estate. The same judges decided
both cases, except that Mr. Justice Linn took part in the Keen case
but not in the Yost case.
In Wolk v. Stefanowicz,18 decided March 25, 1935, an individual
trustee of a judgment note held it without trust label, and instead
of issuing an execution against the obligor's real estate and merchandise, the trustee took a conveyance of that property in his own name,
with no reference to the trust, later sold the property and did not
account for the proceeds as trustee until a bill in equity was filed
against him. The chancellor held the trustee liable for the face
amount of the judgment note, quoting the strict common law rule
as to earmarking, and citing no cases; and the Supreme Court affirmed
in a per curiam opinion and merely quoted from the chancellor's
opinion. While in this case there were apparently (1) some slight
advantage to the trust from ease of transfer, and (2) no direct
connection between the method of holding and the loss to the trust
estate. There was evidently bad faith on the part of the trustee,
but the court does not stress this feature or cite the Keen or Yost
cases. It appears to treat the earmarking rule as an absolute rule,
for the breach of which a penalty is imposed.
Another case involving an effort to secure relaxation of the common
law earmarking rule was Guthrie's Estate,19 which had reached the
Orphans' Court of Allegheny County in time for a decision in February, 1935. That court refused to surcharge a corporate trustee for
holding mortgages in its own name. This decision constituted some
slight support for Keen's Estate, although it would seem to have
been in conflict with the later case of Yost's Estate.
In Connecticut, on the other hand, in the case of Chapter House
Circle v. Hartford National Bank and Trust Company20 it had been
held by the trial court, apparently prior to May, 1935, that failure
by a corporate trustee to earmark a mortgage gave the beneficiaries
the option of avoiding the investment, regardless of good faith or
utility to the trust.
18318 Pa. 197, 177 AtI. 821 (1935).
I 9Reported in the Supreme Court at 320 Pa. 530, 182 AtI. 248 (1936).
2DReported in the Supreme Court at 121 Conn. 558, 186 AtL 543 (1936).
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THE RESTATEMENT OP TRUSTS,

1930

TO MAY,

1935

The Restatement of Trusts was prepared by the American Law
Institute during the years 1930 to 1935. The theory of the Restatement was that it was a clarification and simplification of existing
common law, that if there was a conflict of authorities the rule deemed
superior in theory and effect would be restated, but that if a change
in the common law was deemed necessary it would be recommended
21
as a statute to be offered to the legislatures.
The history of the statement of the earmarking rule by the Institute
is interesting. In Preliminary Draft No. 16, dated April 9, 1930,
there appears for the first time a treatment of the matter. In a
section numbered 174 there is stated a duty on the part of the trustee
to keep the trust property separate from his individual property and
from other non-trust property "and so far as it is reasonable he
should see that the property is designated as property of the trust."
The comment to the Section states that bank deposits, titles to realty,
stock certificates, and registered bonds should be taken in the name
of the trustee as trustee and should ordinarily be so earmarked as to
indicate that they are the property of a particular trust; but the
effect of failure to earmark is not discussed.
This section was brought up by the Reporter, Professor Scott, for
discussion with his advisors in a meeting at Cambridge, May 16 to
18, 1930, but the minutes contain no reference to any discussion of
the earmarking rule.
In the explanatory notes to Tentative Draft No. 1, March 10, 1930,
under Section 174, there appear the words:
"To the effect that it is improper for the trustee to invest trust
funds in his individual name, see De Jarnette v. De Jarnette, 41 Ala.
708 (mortgage); White v. Sherman, 168 IlM. 589 (stock); Knowlton
v. Bradley, 17 N.H. 458 (note); In re Hodges' Estate, 66 Vt. 70
(mortgage)

."

These are all cases where the strict rule of the common law was
enforced. No cases were cited which held that the trustee had
discretion to earmark or not, or that he could earmark when reasonable and be excused from earmarking when a reasonably prudent
man would have failed to earmark. Indeed, at this time (1930), it
would seem that the only support for such a position was the small
amount of case law to the effect that a trustee might hold bearer
21Certificate of Incorporation of American Law Institute; Report of Committee
on Establishment of the Institute, Proceedings of the Institute, vol. 1, pp. 15-17.
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bonds, and that there were a large number of cases holding the direct
opposite with regard to all other types of property.
No substantial change appeared in Section 174 between 1930 and
October, 1934. A tentative draft containing Section 174 was submitted to the Annual Meeting of the Institute in May, 1931, but
there was no discussion of that section. At this meeting, as throughout the entire course of the Institute's consideration of the all
drafts of Restatements, the reporter brought up for discussion by
the meeting only those sections which had aroused controversy among
his advisors or in the Council of the Institute or were for some other
reason thought extraordinary. It would seem debatable whether
Section 174, as it then existed, did not involve a somewhat important deviation from prevalent trust law, meriting discussion by
the members.
In PreliminaryDraft No. 47, dated October 16, 1934, an important
change in Section 174 was made by the addition of a new paragraph
to Comment d, as follows:
"If the trustee takes title to the trust property in his individual name
in good faith, and no loss results from his so doing, he is not liable
for breach of trust. Thus, if the trustee of a mortgage accepts a
conveyance of the property from the mortgagor, and in order to
prevent a merger takes the conveyance in his individual name, acting
in good faith and crediting the trust estate in his accounts with all
receipts from the property, and the only objection to the transaction
is that he took title in his name, he is not liable merely because the
property depreciates in value. The breach of trust in such a case is
merely a technical breach of trust, and no loss has resulted therefrom.
If, however, he took title in his own name in bad faith, intending
to misappropriate the property, he is liable for the full amount of
the mortgage and interest thereon. Even if he acted in good faith,
if a loss resulted from the fact that he took title in his own name,
as for example if his personal creditors were thereby enabled to
reach the property free of the trust, he would be liable for the loss."
This new paragraph was evidently based on Keen's Estate,22 decided
in 1932.
Another important change in Section 174 occurred in Preliminary
Draft No. 49, dated Dec. 15, 1934, which was submitted to and
approved by the Council of the Institute Jan. 30 to Feb. 2, 1935.
The section as then presented read:
22306

Pa. 363, 159 AtI. 713 (1932).
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"Duty to Keep Trust Property Separate. The trustee is uder a
duty to the beneficiary to keep the trust property separate from
his individual property, and, so far as it is reasonable that he should
do so, to keep it separate from other property not subject to the
trust and to see that the property is designated as property of the
trust."
This changed the duty to keep the trust property separate from nontrust property (other than that of the trustee individually) from an
absolute duty to a qualified one, and permitted mingling trust property of the A trust with that of the B trust or with that of a third
person, if it was reasonable to mix them.
Between October, 1934, when the new comment to Section 174,
based on Keen's Estate, was drafted and December, 1934, when Section 174 with its new comment was submitted to the Council of the
Institute, Yost's Estate had been decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. On November 26, 1934, this latter decision was handed
down. It in effect overruled Keen's Estate on which the new comment
to Section 174 was based, but no attention seems to have been paid
to Yost's Estate by the Reporter for Trusts or the Council of the
Institute.
Section 174, as revised in December, 1934, and with the last paragraph of Comment d as revised in October, 1934, was submitted
to the Annual Meeting of the Institute in the Final Draft of the
Restatement of Trusts in May, 1935, and was approved without
discussion or change.
When the Restatement of Trusts was printed at some date after
May, 1935, Section 174 was renumbered 179 and a slight change
was made in the last paragraph of Comment d, the underlined
words being inserted in the following sentence:
"If the trustee takes title to the trust property in his individual name
in good faith, and for a proper purpose, and no loss results from his
so doing, he is not liable for breach of trust."
Two points may be made with regard to the Restatement of Trusts,
Section 179, and Comment d thereto, as finally approved by the
American Law Institute. First, at the times when the section was
first drawn (1930) and was finally approved (1935) there was no
substantial authority in the case law for the proposition that the
duty of a trustee to earmark trust assets as belonging to a particular
trust was a limited or qualified duty, instead of an absolute duty,
except in the case of bearer bonds. With regard to mortgages, stocks,
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registered bonds, notes and bank accounts there was an abundance
of case law to the effect that the trustee was under a duty to earmark
them, and had no discretion to decide whether it was reasonable
to mark them or not. The only authority for the position of the
Restatement that the duty was to earmark "so far as it is reasonable"
was the opinion of the State Banking Department in Pennsylvania,
rulings of Orphans' Courts in that state outside of Philadelphia County,
and the decision in Keen's Estate23, all of which would seem to have
been in substance overruled by Yost's Estate2 4, decided November
26, 1934. It thus seems very questionable whether the Institute was
restating the common law of earmarking in Section 179, or was
instead making new law.
Secondly, Comment d to section 179, was based entirely on Keen's
Estate, and yet at the time this comment was approved by the Institute
in 1935 a later decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Yost's Estate (decided Nov. 26, 1934) had in substance overruled
Keen's Estate, although there was no reference to the former case
in the later opinion of the court.
Evidently the Institute thought it fair and economically sound
to free trustees from liability for failure to obey the common law
earmarking rule, except for damages actually caused by such failure
and in cases of bad faith. There were signs that considerable potential liability existed and was being pressed in the courts in the
1930's. Recommendation of a statute by the Institute would have
been of prospective effect only, and considerable time would have
been lost in promulgating the statute. Therefore, the Institute took
the bull by the horns, based Section 179 on the slightest of judicial
authorities, and ignored a large number of well considered cases to
the contrary in many states.
CAs

LAw

1936

To DATE

Very soon after the promulgation of the Restatement of Trusts
in May, 1935, important cases reached the Supreme Courts of several
states, involving efforts to avoid investments which had been held
without trust label in the individual name of a trustee or in the name
of a nominee, where there had been a great shrinkage in value due
to the depression.
Because of the practices of corporate trustees during the period
just prior to the depression the total potential liabilities from the
23lbid.
24316 Pa. 463, 175 At.

383 (1934).
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application of the strict common law penalty rule were very large.
During the preceding decade thousands of banks had been closed.
Tho remaining banks were in no position to stand millions of dollars
of surcharges for failure to earmark. True they had apparently in
many states flouted the common law rule and taken chances for the
sake of what they thought were benefits to their trusts or for their
own convenience; but the pressure on the courts to save the banks
from an additional enormous burden was great. The public interest
in preserving intact the banking structure was an important influence.
In their argument that the banks should be relieved of this liability
corporate trustees found the Restatement of Trusts, Section 179, the
strongest available support. They could point to very little case law
to back up their claims, except Keen's Estate. But the great prestige
Gf the Institute and its Restatement gave the courts a basis on which
to decide the cases in the way in which their views of public policy
urged them to go.
The first of this line of cases was Guthrie's Estate25, in which the
court refused to hold a corporate trustee liable for the amount invested
in mortgages which had been held without trust label for a time but
which had been labelled as trust property after the decision in Yost's
Estate. The court held that it ought to relieve the trustee from the
penalty of the common law rule, where the trustee had acted in good
faith and no damage to the trust had been caused by lack of earmarking.25-7 For authority it relied on Matter of Union Trust Company28 and Section 179 of the Restatement of Trusts. It states that
the facts of Yost's Estate were very different from those of the Guthrie
case, although it does not point out the details of difference nor are
such differences apparent. Five of the Justices who decided Yost's
Estate were on the court which handed down the decision in Guthrie's
Estate.
In Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. First UnitarianSociety 27,
the objections in the probate court were entirely with regard to the
propriety of participating mortgages as trust investments, but the
Supreme Court in approving them made some statements regarding
the earmarking rule which would seem to have been dicta. In stat25320 Pa. 530, 182 Atl. 248 (1936).
"2aThe power of the court to relieve a trustee from liability where he has committed an admitted breach of trust, but has acted "honestly and reasonably," is
stated in the ENGLISH TRUSTEE Aar, 1925, sec. 61, and in sec. 19 of the UNIFoRl-M
TRusTs Aa-r, adopted in six states.
26219 N.Y. 514, 114 N.E. 1057 (1916), discussed supra note 10.
27293 Mass. 480, 200 N.E. 541 (1936).
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ing that failure to earmark mortgages would not be a basis for surcharging, the court said:
"The books of the petitioner in connection with statutory provisions
[as to physical segregation, reports to the state banking department,
and inspections by it] sufficiently segregated the funds in question
to protect the beneficiaries under the trust. * * * In the case at bar
there is no contention that the petitioner did not exercise good faith
and act for a proper purpose. The loss that has resulted to the
beneficiaries is not due to conduct of the petitioner or the kind of
investment made, but to adverse general financial conditions. 277
The Massachusetts court cited as authorities for its views First
National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospita,28 holding that lack
of diversification was not ground for surcharge when it caused no
damage; and Springfield National Bank of Springfield v. Couse, 29
holding that one who acted as trustee prior to a technically sufficient
transfer to him would not be surcharged where no loss arose from
this act; and the Restatement of Trusts, § 179, Comment d.
In The Chapter House Circle of the King's Daughters v. Hartford
National Bank & Trust Co,30 the Supreme Court of Connecticut had
before it a case where a corporate trustee which had an agency account
took a note and mortgage to itself, without fiduciary label, but deposited a declaration of trust in the principal's portfolio. It used this
system to facilitate transfers from one agency or trust account to
another. The court held that, although there was a breach of trust,
it would refuse to decree the common law penalty of liability for
the amount invested in the mortgage. The opinion by Maltbie, C. J.,
is the most thorough and detailed of any of the judicial discussions
which have come to the attention of the writer. The court expressed
itself strongly in favor of the maintenance of earmarking by corporate
as well as individual trustees, but it rebelled at imposing a penalty.
It cited Guthrie's Estate and the Restatement of Trusts, § 179 (d).
With the backing of the strong decisions in Guthrie's Estate and
the Chapter House case, the dictum in the Springfield Safe Deposit
case, and the Restatement, trustees found it relatively easy to secure
the approval of the relaxation of the earmarking rule in other states
im the late 1930's and in the 1940's.
In Pennsylvania, following Guthrie's Estate, there seem to have
been four cases, one of which applied the old rule, but the other three
27 293 Mass. 480 at 488, 200 N.E. 541 at 546.
28288 Mass. 35, 192 N.E. 150 (1934).
29288 Mass. 2620, 192 N.E. 529 (1934).
s0121 Conn. 558, 186 At. 543 (1936).
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approved Guthrie's Estate in its relaxation of the older rule. In
Fenelli's Estate,3 ' a corporate trustee was held liable for the amount
invested in a mortgage which it failed to earmark, the court stating
the old rule and citing Yost's Estate. While it referred to Guthrie's
32
Estate, it did not follow it or elaborate on its effect. Dillon's Estate,
Harton's Estate,33 and Swindell's Estate," were all mortgage cases,

and all refused to impose a penalty on the trustee where there was
good faith and no damage resulted from the method of holding. All
relied on Guthrie's Estate.

Other decisions approving the rule as laid down in the Restatement,
and following the leading cases mentioned above, appeared in 1937
in Florida3" and the Federal District Court for Alabama,.3 in 1938
in Nebraska- and New Jersey,38 in 1939 in the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 9 and in Alabama, " in 1940 in Virginia,"'
in 1941 in Washington, 42 in 1943 in New Hampshire,4 3 and in 1944
s323 Pa. 49, 185 At. 758 (1936); 330 Pa. 499, 199 AUt. 496 (1938).
32324 Pa. 252, 188 Atl. 134 (1936).
33331 Pa. 507, 1A.(2d) 292 (1938).
34332 Pa. 161, 3A.(2d) 2 (1938).
35Voorhies v. Blood, 127 Fla. 337, 171 So. 658 (1937) (mortgage; good faith
and lack of damage).
8
6Barker v. First National Bank of Birmingham, 20 F.Supp. 185 (mortgage;
breach held technical only when no loss caused).
3
'Rotzin v. Miller, 134 Neb. 8, 277 N.W. 811 (1938) (mortgage and later title
to land; decision based on Restatement). The court first wrote an opinion in
favor of surcharge but later changed its mind. There was a vigorous and wellreasoned dissent by Justices Rose, Eberly and Day. In re Estate of Boschulte,
130 Neb. 284, 264 N.W. 881 (1936), was overruled.
38Cox v. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 490, 2A.(2d) 473 (1938)
(participating mortgage; good faith; no loss from method of holding; court relied
entirely on the dictum in the Springfield case).
39
Potter v. Union & Peoples National Bank of Jackson, 105 F.(2d) 437 (corporate
trustee used partnership of employees as a nominee to hold stock; good faith and
no loss from method of holding; court relied entirely on the Restatement).
40
First National Bank of Birmingham v. Basham, 238 Ala. 500, 191 So. 873
(1939) (corporate trustee took mortgage to itself, but indorsed note and assigned
mortgage to self as trustee but assignment not recorded; earmarking sufficient or
if not trustee protected by godd faith and lack of loss due to method.of holding).
-'Buckle v. Marshall, 176 Va. 139, 10 S.E.(2d) 506 (1940) (individual administrator held registered bonds in own name for ease of transfer but wrote on each
bond that it was held for the estate and kept bonds separate from own property;
while recognizing the common law rule the court held the informal earmarking
sufficient; strong dissent by Campbell, C. J., as to adequacy of earmarking.
42
(bonds held by
1n re Lefevre, 9 Wash.(2d) 145, 113 P.(2d) 1014 (1941)
guardian in own name; no liability where good faith and method of holding did
not cause loss).
SMiller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A.(2d) 663 (1943) (individual trustee held
securities, probably stocks, in own name; court refused to impose common law
penalty, holding that it was too severe).
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in Canada. 4"
Thus, a large body of case law has been built up since May, 1935,
to the effect that if a trustee holds any trust investment except a bank
account in his own name, or in the name of a nominee, acts in good
faith, and the method of holding does not cause any loss, there is no
liability on the part of the trustee, even though the asset may have
depreciated or become valueless. Complete records in the office of
the trustee and the accomplishment of a purpose useful to the trust
doubtless have weight in proving good faith.
EASY TRANSFERABILITY

op

TRUST ASSETS; NOMINEE STATUTES

The emphasis of the Restatement, §179, and of the case law from
1936 to date seems to have been on freeing trustees from a penalty
for failure to earmark and thus on protecting them from a liability
which was believed to have been -unwarranted.
Beginning about 1935 and continuing to date another but related
mnovement has been gaining momentum, namely, the trend toward
the adoption of statutes permitting the holding of trust investments
in the names of nominees. Here the argument has not been the
need to free trustees from unjustified liabilities, but rather the
desirability of making trust investments more easily transferable,
and the handicaps which earmarking imposes on quick disposal of
trust assets.
The rules of stock exchanges provide that tender of stock which
is held in the name of a fiduciary is not a "good delivery," that is,
such stock cannot be made the basis of an immediate sale but has to
be contracted to be sold at a future date, after proof of authority to
sell has been presented. Therefore, trustees who desire to take
advantage of stock market prices on a certain day are greatly handicapped, if they earmark the stock; and transfers are greatly facilitated
if the stock is in the name of an individual or partnership as a
nominee."
In weighing this argument one should bear in mind that discretionary investment clauses in many important trust instruments and
the increasing adoption of the prudent investor rule by legislatures
have resulted in the acquisition and retention of a great deal of
4"Re Brown, [1944] 4 Dom.L.R. 419 (corporate trustee; mortgage).
"5For excellent discussions of the whole problem of nominees and earmarking,
but particularly with regard to corporate stock, see Capron, Nominee Registration
of Fiduciary Securities (1944) 79 TRUSTS & ESTATES 309 (1944); Horn and Dixon,
Nominee Registration to the Fore, (1939) 69 TiusTs & ESTATES 271. See also
l
CHRUSTY AND McLEAx, THE TRANsPEsR o , STOCK (2d ed. 1940).

TRUST INVESTMENTS: EARMARKING OR NOMINEES? 433
corporate stock by trustees. One well-informed writer estimates that
at least a third of all trust investments in dollar value are stocks.4
While trustees are not supposed to buy and sell for speculative
purposes, but rather with the object of maintaining capital and reasonable flow of income, a greait many sales of stocks by trustees are
required for legitimate trust purposes or are demanded by settlors
who have reserved power to themselves to direct investments.
This argument from the necessity for speedy sales would not seem
to apply to transfers of mortgages or fee tiles, where purchasers are
willing to wait a few days for proof of authority and completion of
transfers, and to pay the same price as if the transaction could be
completed in a single day. Nor would the element of speed seem
to be important in cases where the trustee is borrowing and giving
a mortgage or pledge as security.
Those favoring the use of nominees also urge that transfers by
a trustee can be made by a trustee at less cost if nominees are used,
since on transfer by the nominee no proof of the authority and powers
of the trustee will have to be made. Transfer agents and registrars
require proof of authority before they will complete a transfer from
a fiduciary; and buyers, mortgagees, or pledgees of mortgages or of
tiles to realty or personalty which are labelled as held for a trust
demand similar proof.
These expenses, however, are not great. A single copy of the trust
instrument or letters of trusteeship can often be used for numerous
transactions. And, furthermore, if a trustee holds stock first as
trustee and then seeks to register it in the name of a nominee, proof
of authority must be given to the transfer agent or registrar.
It would not seem that the argument based on economy ought to
be conclusive. Admittedly if nominees are not used there will be
some additional expense for proof of authority, and some increase in
correspondence and paper work in some instances. But in other
instances nominees cause increased labor for the trustee. If substantial
protection comes to the beneficiary from earmarking, it will be worth
what it costs.
With respect to stock the need for speed of transfer would seem
to be a more potent argument.
Beginning in 1935 there has been a strong trend toward the
adoption of statutes permitting fiduciaries to hold some or all invest46STEPHEES0N, NOMINEE REGISTRATION op SicurTnEs HEL

(14).
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ments in their individual names or in the names of nominees."7
Bankers' Associations have drafted and worked for statutes of this
type. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1937 approved the Uniform Trusts Act, section 9 of which
validated the use of nominees with some qualifications.
The Pennsylvania Legislature of 1935 adopted two acts on the
subject, the first, P.L. 1935, no. 200, permitting corporate fiduciaries
to hold all investments in their own names or in the names of
nominees,, if the books of the bank dearly showed the facts as
to ownership; and the second, P.L. 1935, no. 524, providing that,
if a trust company had previously carried investments in real property
without earmarking, a court might stay a suit to avoid the investment for a period not to exceed two years.
Section 9 of the Uniform Trusts Act reads as follows:
"A trustee owning stock may hold it in the name of a nominee,
without mention of the trust in the stock certificate or stock registration book; provided that (1) the trust records and all reports or
accounts rendered by the trustee clearly show the ownership of the
stock by the trustee and the facts regarding its holding; (2) the
nominee shall deposit with the trustee a signed statement showing
the trust ownership, shall endorse the stock certificate in blank, and
shall not have possession of the stock certificate or access thereto
except under the immediate supervision of the trustee. The trustee
shall personally be liable for any loss to the trust resulting from
any act of such nominee in connection with such stock so held."
This statute has been adopted, with some variations, in six states. 8
Other nominee statutes, apparently drawn by trust men, have been
adopted in twelve states.49 They vary to a considerable extent.
Some cover corporate fiduciaries only,50 others both individual and
corporate fiduciaries. 5' Some apply to trustees only, 52 some to
47For an excellent study of the whole problem, including statutory development,
see STEPnmsoN, NomzxNx
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(American
Bankers' Association, 1944).
48 La. Acts 1938, no. 81; N.G. L. 1939, c. 197; Old. L. 1941, p. 252; Nev. L.
1941, c. 136; S.D. L. 1943, c. 308; TmxAs TR. AcT 1943, TEx. PRv. Civ. STAT.
(Vernon, 1925) art. 7425b-16.
"9Cal. L. 1941, c. 795, L. 1943, c. 811; Fla. L. 1937, p. 1283; Ky. L. 1944,
c. 11; Minn. L. 1943, cc. 338-9; N.H. L. 1941, c. 68; N.J. L. 1944, c. 114;
N.Y. L. 1939, c. 343 (Surr. Ct Act, sec. 231), L. 1944, c. 215 (Pers. Prop. L.,
sec. 25); Oh. L. 1945, S.B. 180; Ore. L. 1941, c. 35; Pa. 7 P.S. 819-1101, 1102,
1108; W.Va. L. 1945, S.B. 139; Wis. L. 1941, c. 247.
5OCal., Ky., Minn., N.H., N.J., N.C., Oh., Ore., Pa., W.Va.
51
Fla., La., Nev., N.Y. (if deposited with bank for safekeeping and bank places
in name of nominee); Okl., S.D., Tex., Wis. (same as N.Y.).
52
Fla., La., Nev., Ore., S.D., and Tex.
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other named fiduciaries 53 or to all fiduciaries. 5' Some permit the
use of nominees in the holding of corporate stock only, 55 others apply
to stock or other securities;56 and some are broad enough to cover
5
all investments. 7
The conditions precedent established by these statutes as prerequisites for the use of nominees likewise differ. It is usual to
require that the records of the fiduciary shall show the facts of
ownership, 8 and that the property shall be physically separated from
the assets of the fiduciary.5 9 Frequently also the power of the
nominee is limited by requiring him to sign a declaration of trust, 60
or indorse the stock certificate 61 or give a stock power, 2 and by
prohibiting the fiduciary from giving the nominee possession of, or
access to, the property.6 3 The fiduciary is commonly made liable
for any breach of duty on the part of the nominee.Some of these acts are broad enough to allow the fiduciary to
hold trust property in his own name without earmarking,5 but
most of them deal with the use of nominees only.
In 1945 the Trust Division of the American Bankers' Association
proposed to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws that it draft a nominee statute to take the place of section 9 of the Trusts Act of 1937 and of the various bank-sponsored
nominee statutes which had been adopted since 1935. This invitation
was accepted and the subject is now being considered by the Property
Acts Section of the Conference, of which L. A. Howard, 6 6 Esq., of
Hartford, Conn., is chairman. Hon. Sherman R. Moulton, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Vermont, who is a member of the
Section, has consented to act as draftsman. Such a substitute, revised
statute might have the effect of producing uniformity in those states
5

Cal., Ky., Minn., N.Y., Wis.
54N.H., N.J., N.C., Oh., Pa., W.Va.
55
Fla., Nev., N.C., Okl., S.D.
5dCal., Ky., N.J., N.Y., Oh., W.Va., Wis.
5
7Minn., Ore., Pa., Tex.
5
Cal., Ky., La., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y.,

N.C., Oh., Okl., Pa.,

S.D., Tex.,

W.Va., Wis.
59Cal., Ky., N.J., N.Y., Wis.
6OLa., Old., S.D., Tex., W.Va. (all necessary documents).
61
La., Old., S.D., Tex.
62
Nev., Tex. (if stock certificate not indorsed).
63
La., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.C., Okl., S.D., Tex., W.Va.
64
Fla., Ky., La., Minn., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Oh., Okl., S.D., Tex.,
W.Va., Wis.

65Ky., Oh., Ore., Pa., W.Va.
66 See Howard, The Use of Nominees by Fiduciaries, (1938) 12 CoNN. B~t J. 225.
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which have indicated a willingness to permit the use of nominees, and
might be helpful in persuading the thirty states which have not yet
adopted nominee statutes to sanction this practice in fiduciary administration.
Another statutory approach to the objective of giving trust assets
free and untrammeled transferability is the abolition of the rule
that one dealing with a kn6wn trustee is charged with knowledge of
the powers of the trustee.
The Oregon Legislature, in its nominee act of 1941, has made this
direct approach to the problem of notice to third parties dealing with
trustees. It provided:
"'In acquiring, holding, satisfying and conveying of any trust asset
or any investment of trust funds, it shall not be the duty of any trust
company to disclose that it is acting in a fiduciary capacity or the
terms or conditions of the instrument pursuant to which it acts or
the nature or extent of its authority or the application of the proceeds
of such transaction, nor shall any person dealing with such trust
company be required or authorized or permitted to inquire into the
said matters, or any of them, except to the extent or for the purposes
specified in section 40-1222.'67
If legislatures would adopt such a statute, and stock exchanges would
thereafter make tenders of stock held by a fiduciary good delivery,
some delays and expense incident to transfer by trustees would be
avoided, without the use of nominees, and one strong argument for
the abolition of the earmarking rule would be done away with.6
Something of this sort was attempted in the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act (now adopted in at least 20 states) which declared that transfer
agents and banks would be held to have participated in breaches
of trust with regard to stock, bank accounts, and commercial paper
only where they received a benefit from the breach of trust, had
actual knowledge of the intended breach, or had knowledge of facts
which made their acts evidence of "bad faith." This generally
relieved these intermediaries who dealt with trustees from the duty
to inquire into the propriety of the conduct of the trustees. But it
157L. 1941, c. 35.
6
8In at least one midwestern city corporate trustees which have realty for sale
convey it to another trust company under a subtrust for sale and provide in the
deed to the sub-trustee that no person dealing "with said trustee be required or
privileged to inquire into the necessity or expediency of any act of said trustee,
or of the provisions of this instrument." The sub-trustee is in practical effect a
nominee. It seems doubtful whether a term in the sub-trust instrument can
abolish the common law rule that one dealing with a known trustee is charged
with knowledge of the powers of that trustee.
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is understood that transfer agents and registrars, notwithstanding
this statute, require proof of authority from fiduciaries because of
the exceptions named in the statute and the possibilities of liability
coming from those excepted cases. Thus, to some extent the intent
of the framers of this Uniform Act has been frustrated by the
superabundant caution of the transfer agents. In any Act covering
persons dealing directly with trustees for their own benefit, and
attempting to relieve them from the duty to. inquire, it would seem
that the same exceptions would have to be made, and consequently
that extreme caution might in some cases nullify such legislation,
as it has done with the Fiduciaries Act.
While the statutes permitting the use of nominees in substance
do away with the duty of third parties to inquire about the terms
of the trust, and legislatures seem willing enough to pass such acts,
it is doubted whether they would be so acquiescent in abolishing
the long standing rule that one dealing with a legal entity which
is generally or frequently of limited power takes the risk that the
contemplated act is within the powers of the party with whom he
deals.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE

NEAR

FUTUIE

There can be little doubt that the Restatement of Trusts, Section
179, will continue to receive the judicial approval which has been
accorded to it in the cases decided since 1935 which are discussed
above. How trust assets are held will be a matter for the exercise
of reasonable judgment by the trustee. It may be urged that such
rulings obviate the need for statutes providing for nominees, since
in all probability, in most cases, holding investments in the name of
a nominee will be held by the courts to be reasonably prudent and
useful.
It is believed, however, that corporate trustees will not be content
with probable protection under the Restatement, but will rather continue to press nominee statutes so as to obtain a clearcut definition as
to the extent to which they can safely depart from the common law
earmarking rule. The action of the Trust Division, American Bankers'
Association, in soliciting cobperation from the Uniform Law Conference is in this direction.
In preparing a model nominee statute it might be well to consider
whether .such an act should be framed on the theory (1) that it
treats the Restatement, Section 179, as intact and merely gives one
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legislative example of reasonable conduct in holding without earmarks, leaving it open for the courts to adjudge that in other cases
the conduct may also be reasonable; or (2) that the strict common
law earmarking rule is in effect, except as qualified by the nominee
8 9
statute. This latter idea is adopted by the New York statute.
The first method amounts to a reaffirmation of the Restatement
rule, supplemented by a declaration that one type of conduct is
reasonable under the Restatement. The second method would be
founded on the idea of repudiating the Restatement, Section 179,
returning to the common law, but relaxing the rigor of that rule
to a certain extent. Unless the rationale of the model act is made
clear, the door may be left open for litigation. The doctrine expressio unius, exclusio alterius, may be invoked.
In the opinion of the writer the model statute should sanction the
use of nominees in those cases where they serve an important trust
purpose, but not in the instances where the mere convenience or
economy of the trustee is involved. Bearer bonds and corporate
stock seem to be the only cases of real need for relaxation of the
common law rule. All fiduciaries should be treated alike. The
trustee deserves no special consideration. Individual fiduciaries should
be allowed the same privileges as corporate fiduciaries, but the New
York scheme of requiring individual fiduciaries to deposit the securities which are held in the name of a nominee with a bank or
trust company should be considered.70 The rule that third persons
dealing with a known trustee are charged with knowledge of his
powers should not be abolished.
The importance of case and statute law with relation to nominees
and earmarking may easily be exaggerated. Many trust institutions
suggest inserting in trust instruments clauses which permit the use
of nominees, and this advice is frequently followed by settlors. Some
conservative corporate trustees rarely use nominees, except as thus
authorized.
6OSumt. CT. Acr, §231; PEas. Paop. L., §25.
70See notes 39 and 41 supra.

